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Abstract
Recent contributions on oshoring often assume that rms can freely
split their production process into separate steps which can be ranked
according to the cost savings from producing abroad. We replace this
assumption by the notion of a technologically determined sequence of
production steps. In our model, cost savings from oshoring 
uctu-
ate along the production chain, and moving unnished goods across
borders causes transport costs. We show that, in such a setting, rms
may refrain from oshoring even if relocating individual steps would
be advantageous in terms of oshoring costs, or they may oshore
(almost) the entire production chain to save transport costs. Small
variations in model parameters may have a substantial impact on o-
shoring activities.
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Over the past decade, signicant attention has been devoted to the phe-
nomenon of oshoring, i.e. the fact that rms exploit international cost
dierences by fragmenting their production process across national borders.
The rising importance of oshoring has been supported by a number of fac-
tors: a strong decline in transportation costs, the fall of the iron curtain,
widespread liberalization of FDI policies, and improvements in means of in-
ternational communication through new information technologies. In many
rich countries, this development has raised fears about potential job losses,
declining wages, and rapid de-industrialization. In fact, the public discussion
abounds with anecdotes about value-added chains spanning the entire globe
and grim forecasts of rich countries eventually degenerating to mere trading
centers for goods produced at low-cost locations.
Given this heightened public interest, it is of no surprise that an increas-
ing number of researchers is exploring the determinants and consequences
of rms' oshoring decisions. Beginning with the seminal contribution of
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), various attempts have been undertaken to
analyze the implications of the \second unbundling" { i.e. the disintegration
of the production process { in a coherent, yet tractable way.1 Quite recently,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) [henceforth denoted by GRH] proposed
a model that has become very in
uential in this respect. In their approach,
the production process consists of dierent \tasks" which are performed by
various types of labor and which may be done at home or oshored to a
foreign country.2 Whether oshoring is advantageous depends both on in-
ternational wage dierentials and on task-specic iceberg costs, which re
ect
the frictions associated with transmitting information and monitoring for-
eign activities. The crucial assumption of the GRH-framework is that tasks
may be ranked according to these costs such that there is a unique threshold
which determines the extent of oshoring: at given wages, all tasks up to this
threshold level are done abroad while the rest is performed at home. Changes
in relative wages or in the costs of oshoring shift the extensive margin of
oshoring. A decline in oshoring costs, for example, results in more tasks
1The term \second unbundling" goes back to Baldwin (2006) to distinguish the spatial
fragmentation of production from trade in nal goods. A short and necessarily selective
list of contributions to the literature includes Jones and Kierzkowski (1990; 2001a; 2001b),
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a; 1996b; 1997; 1999), Arndt (1997), Venables (1999), Glass
and Saggi (2001), Jones (2000), Deardor (2001b; 2001a), Kohler (2004), and Egger and
Egger (2007).
2By using the term oshoring instead of international outsourcing we indicate that the
geographical location of production is at the center of our interest while we abstract from
the rms' make-or-buy decision.
1being performed abroad.
While the approach of GRH provides an elegant framework to open the
black box of production it neglects three important aspects of reality: First,
in many industries technology determines the sequence of tasks or production
steps such that a rearrangement according to oshoring costs alone seems
implausible.3 The panels for a car-body are rst pressed, then joined together
and then sprayed; an airplane is rewired before the seats can be attached;
the production chain for microchips begins with making silicon from quartz,
purifying the silicon in a second step before wafers are produced, microchips
are built on these wafers, and, nally, wafers are cut apart; in the textile
industry one rst needs to produce cotton or wool, then to spin yarn before
this yarn can be woven or knitted. All these steps follow each other and
cannot be simply re-organised according to oshoring costs or other criteria.
Second, performing a certain production step often requires the unnished
good or at least a component of it to be physically present: spraying a car is
impossible without having the car-body in the factory, weaving fabric requires
the yarn etc. Finally, moving these intermediate goods across borders is
associated with signicant costs, which encompass physical transport costs
as well as the costs of uncertain or delayed delivery.
In this paper, we present a formal framework that incorporates these
observations in a transparent and tractable fashion. We set up a stylized
partial equilibrium model of an industry that applies a technology with a
continuum of production steps each of which can be located in the home
country or abroad. We deviate from the previous literature assuming that
production steps have to be undertaken in a predetermined sequence, a pro-
duction step always requires the physical presence of the unnished good,
and shipment of the unnished good across borders causes transport costs.
To see why and how these deviating assumptions matter, suppose there
exists a sequence of production steps, say A, B, C, D, and steps A and C can
be done more cheaply abroad while the converse is true for production steps
B and D. To oshore only steps A and C, production begins abroad with
step A, then the unnished good must be shipped shipped back to perform
3The dierence between tasks and production steps is subtle, but important: GRH
assign a task to a specic type of labor { i.e. there are \high-skilled tasks" and \low-
skill-tasks". By contrast, the production steps we have in mind potentially employ various
types of labor (as in Dixit and Grossman, 1982; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1997; Kohler,
2004). Oshoring of production steps imposes the technological requirement that certain
tasks, each performed by one particular production factor, must be bundled together to
a production step at one location. Oshoring of single tasks assumes, instead, that each
single task can be performed at a certain location independent of where other tasks are
performed.
2step B at home, shipped abroad again for step C, and nally shipped back
home to perform step D. If transport costs for the unnished good at its
various stages are large, then such a strategy of partial oshoring may not
be protable. But this does not necessarily imply that there is no oshoring
at all. Instead, although in itself it is not worthwhile to oshore step B, the
rm may relocate this production step as well because steps A and C are
worthwhile to oshore and adding step B saves transport costs twice. We
call such a strategy full oshoring.
The decision to oshore one particular step thus essentially depends on
the protability to oshore adjacent steps, which may result in a tendency to
lump together several parts of the production chain in one location. The ex-
tent to which this happens depends on a range of industry-specic parameters
characterizing the production process, transport costs, and oshoring costs.
We thus combine the argument that \...oshoring is an industry-specic phe-
nomenon, relating to the idiosyncratic way in which the value added process
of certain industry may be sliced up, or fragmented, into dierent tasks"
(Kohler, 2008, p. 11) with the concept of a technologically determined se-
quence of production steps. This has an immediate consequence for how
the extent of oshoring in a particular industry reacts to parameter varia-
tions: our framework suggests that such changes may occur in the form of
discretionary regime shifts. This contrasts with the GRH-model where a mi-
nor variation of exogenous parameters leads to a smooth adjustment of the
number of tasks that are performed abroad. We obtain such a \catastrophic
shift" between industry-specic oshoring regimes even though we assume a
CRS-technology. The mere existence of transport costs combined with the
predetermined sequence of production steps is sucient to lump together
production steps, causing an international bundling or unbundling of large
chunks of a production chain at marginal changes of transport-, production-,
or oshoring costs.
Our model thus not only oers an explanation for why dierent industries
may have quite dierent fragmentation intensities even though factor cost
dierences and oshoring costs are not obviously dierent (see Geishecker
and G org, 2008). It also rationalizes a discrepancy between estimates of
the \oshoring potential" for certain industrialized countries and the actual
volume of oshoring activities. In our model, such a dierence directly follows
from the joint assumptions of sequential production and transport costs:
despite a large oshoring potential in terms of relative cost advantages, rms
may choose to perform certain production steps at a single location since
they are rmly tied into a technologically determined production chain.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The following section
2 describes the model, section 3 derives the oshoring pattern, comparative
3statics are performed in section 4, section 5 extends the model to analyze as to
how a modularization of the production process and the presence of multiple




Consider a competitive rm in sector i which produces a homogeneous good
under constant returns to scale. Technology consists of a continuum of pro-
duction steps which can be oshored abroad to exploit factor cost dierences.
Each production step in this industry combines high- and low-skilled la-
bor. The input coecients of production step t in industry i are denoted
by aih (t) for high-skilled labor and by ail (t) for low-skilled labour. Factor
prices are exogenously given. We follow GRH in assuming identical factor
intensities for each production step, i.e. ais (t) = ais, for s = l;h: If produc-
tion takes place in a domestic plant, then unit factor costs of each production
step t in industry i are given by ci (wl;wh) = ail wl +aih wh, where wl; and
wh are the domestic wage rates for high- and low-skilled labor, respectively.
For brevity, we will omit the arguments of ci wherever applicable.
If production step t is oshored, then production costs are raised by
oshoring costs of the iceberg-type, that is, foreign production costs are
multiplied by the term di(t) > 1. This re
ects the additional costs associated
with performing step t in the foreign country (e.g. costs of communication
between headquarter and production unit or supervision costs).4 Without
loss of generality we normalize unit factor costs abroad to  ci = 1. The unit
cost function of the oshored production step t in industry i is then given by
di(t).
We deviate from the previous literature with respect to the ordering of
production steps. While existing models of oshoring generally assume that
production steps can be lined up according to their oshoring costs, this may
not be the case in reality.
Assumption 1 There is a technically determined sequence t, in which pro-
duction steps have to be processed one after the other.
Our second crucial assumption is based on the notion that every pro-
duction step requires the presence of the unnished good produced at the
4Instead of assuming oshoring costs, we could also consider dierences between the
home and the foreign country with respect to total factor productivity. The term di(t)
then represents the productivity advantage of the home country relative to the foreign
location with respect to performing production step t.
4preceding step. While transportation is assumed to be costless within na-
tional borders, any international change of location is costly:
Assumption 2 Any crossing of borders between two adjacent production
steps is associated with constant costs Ti per goods unit.
The variable Ti captures not only the costs arising from physical trans-
portation, but also from the risk of delayed delivery. Note that the magnitude
of Ti is independent of the stage of the production process.
To capture the idea that the costs of oshoring may go up and down
along the production chain, we assume that di(t) takes the form of a cosine
function.5
Assumption 3 Oshoring costs are given by di (t) = Ai cos(it)+Bi, where
t 2 [0;2ni] and Bi   Ai  1.
The restriction on Bi   Ai ensures that di (t)  1 for all t { i.e., o-
shoring costs are always positive. Although the specic functional form for
the oshoring costs may appear somewhat unfamiliar in the context of in-
ternational production, its parameters have a straightforward and natural
interpretation (see Figure 1): the shift parameter Bi determines average
oshoring costs, i.e., if Bi is very high, the frictions associated with com-
munication and supervision render oshoring relatively unattractive for the
\average" production step. The amplitude Ai of the cost function re
ects
dierences in oshoring costs between individual production steps. A high
value of Ai implies a wide range between lowest and highest oshoring costs
over the production chain. The parameter i species the period (2=i) of
the oshoring cost function. It determines how frequently oshoring costs of
single production steps alternate around the average value of Bi along the
production chain. If i is high, closely-linked production steps dier sub-
stantially in relative oshoring costs. Conversely, if i is low, the sets of
adjacent production steps which are characterized by lower or higher than
average oshoring costs are large, making it advantageous ceteris paribus to
perform comparatively large chunks of the production process in one location
(at home or abroad). Finally, ni determines the total length of the produc-
tion chain 2ni, distinguishing production processes with many from those
5The choice to x the foreign cost level while allowing the costs of delegation di(t) to
vary across production steps is inconsequential in our partial-equilibrium setup. We could
as well have xed oshoring costs and allowed factor costs to vary along the production
process { with this variation being due to either changing input coecients or a varying
total factor productivity. Of course, when our model is extended to a general-equilibrium
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Figure 1: Oshoring Costs
with only a few production steps. To keep the analysis tractable while still
being able to perform comparative-static analysis with respect to i and ni,
we assume ini 2 N+. The oshoring cost function di (t) then exhibits ini
full cycles. Dierent values of i or ni thus imply dierent numbers of cycles
while the overall shape of di (t) for t 2 [0;2ni] keeps being symmetric.
Hence, in addition to the transport cost Ti, we have four parameters to
describe the technological environment of the oshoring decision. We later
capture technological or institutional change by varying these parameters
{ by lowering average oshoring costs and the heterogeneity of these costs
(lowering Bi and Ai, respectively), by allowing for an increased heterogene-
ity in the production process (raising i) or by changing the length of the
production chain ni.
Our last assumption anchors the production chain in the domestic econ-
omy.
Assumption 4 The nal product is sold in the home market.
This assumption implies that rms have to ship their nal input back home
(at a cost Ti) even if they choose to perform all production steps abroad.
Whether such a decision is protable will be analyzed in the following section.
63 The Oshoring Decision
Given our specication of the oshoring cost curve, we may now characterize
the oshoring decision. This is done in Figure 2. To make the model interest-
ing we only consider the case Bi Ai < ci < Bi+Ai, i.e. both locations have
a cost advantage for at least some production steps. Since Bi   Ai  1 this
also implies ci > 1. Thus, we exclude factor price equalization by assump-
tion.6 Given that the di(t)-function exhibits ini full cycles in the interval
[0;2ni] we can dene the set of critical production steps (t
1i;:::;t
mi) where

































1i; for j 2 E ;
where U are the uneven integers f1;3;:::;mi   1g and E the even integers
f2;4;:::;mig, with mi  2ini representing the total number of critical pro-
duction steps.
By the periodicity of the oshoring cost function di (t) and the assumption
concerning the parameter range of ci, oshoring costs are lower than factor






, j 2 U, whereas oshoring costs are at
least as high as factor cost savings along [t
ji;t
j+1;i]; j 2 E; as well as at the
beginning and the end of the production chain, i.e. in [0;t
1i] and [t
mi;2ni].
Figure 2 depicts the case of mi = 4. For all steps in the interval [0;t
1i]
production costs abroad (including oshoring costs) are at least as high as
domestic production costs. For all steps in (t
1i;t
2i) producing abroad is
cheaper than producing at home, even if oshoring costs are taken into ac-
count. In the interval [t
2i;t
3i] domestic production weakly dominates foreign
production etc.
If there were no transport costs, the rm in sector i would obviously
exploit all cost dierences and produce abroad whenever di(t) < ci. However,
once the costs of shipping intermediate goods back and forth are strictly
positive, the size of cost savings matters as well. We denote the total cost




i . It follows
6In general equilibrium, factor costs would be endogenous. A failure of international

























Figure 2: Cost Savings from Oshoring





























Taking the derivative of (2) with respect to t




1i = 0: Oshoring additional production steps has no eect on
cost savings D
 
i at the margin. Increasing the amplitude of the di(t) function
obviously increases D
 
i , i.e. @D
 
i =@Ai > 0. Moreover, t
1i < =i implies that
@D
 
i =@Bi < 0 and @D
 
i =@ci > 0: higher average oshoring costs { re
ected
by an upward shift of the di(t)-curve { render oshoring less advantageous,
whereas a higher factor cost-advantage of the foreign country { re
ected by
a higher value of ci { has the opposite eect. To determine the in
uence
of i on D
 
i we cannot simply look at the derivative, because ini is an
integer. However, inserting t
i1 into (2) shows that the product i D
 
i does
not change in i, which means that D
 
i declines in i. Recall that a higher
value of i re
ects greater heterogeneity of adjacent production steps in terms
of relative oshoring costs. Technically, raising i ceteris paribus raises the
frequency of the di(t)-function, reduces the length of the interval (t
1i;t
2i)
and thus diminishes the cost savings associated with oshoring a sequence
of production steps.
Likewise, the cost savings from performing production steps in the interval
8[t
2i;t

























where we have exploited the fact that (t
3i   t
2i) = 2t
1i. As with D
 
i we
can show that @D
+
i =@t
1i = 0 and that @D
+
i =@Ai > 0. Conversely, but for
obvious reasons, @D
+
i =@Bi > 0 and @D
+
i =@ci < 0. The in












(ci   Bi) : (4)
This equation compares cost savings from oshoring production segments
for which the foreign country has lower unit costs with cost savings from





is positive if and only if factor costs at home ci exceed average ohoring
costs Bi. For this case we can say that the foreign country has a total
cost advantage to produce good i. Note, nally, that the absolute value of
cost savings decreases in i: if the foreign country oers a cost advantage
for \shorter" segments of the production process this reduces the relative
benets of oshoring these segments.
The last term to be determined is the cost advantage from producing the
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We can now turn to the oshoring decision of rms in sector i. Obviously,
the last sequence [t
mi;2ni] always takes place at home, because, rst, it is
cheaper to produce these steps at home and, second, the nal good needs to
be present at home by Assumption 4.
With respect to the other production steps we can distinguish the fol-
lowing oshoring regimes: no oshoring at all, full oshoring, and partial
oshoring.
Denition 1 Full oshoring: the sequence of production steps in the interval
[0;t
mi) is oshored.









Full oshoring implies that all production steps except for the last se-
quence [t
mi;2ni] are done abroad. Hence, it causes transport cost Ti only
once for shipping the intermediate good back to the home country. Partial
oshoring instead involves sending forth and back the good, wherever seg-
ments of the production chain are manufactured abroad. Hence, the unn-
ished good crosses the border 2mi times in the production process. Because
the oshoring cost function is symmetric, rms oshore all segments with
ci > di(t) if it is worthwhile oshoring one of them. By the same type of
argument we can exclude oshoring patterns other than no-, partial- or full
oshoring.7 For example, producing the rst sequence t 2 [0;t
i1] at home
gives a cost advantage of D
+
i =2 but raises transport costs by T. This is ex-
actly half of the cost advantage and additional transport costs that would
occur from producing a sequence [t
ji;t
j+1;i], j 2 E at home. If partial o-
shoring is worthwile later in the production chain, it is so for the rst sequence
as well.
To determine the optimal oshoring pattern for a rm in sector i we
simply have to compare costs under the three dierent regimes. If there is no
oshoring, total costs Cn
i to produce one unit of the good are Cn
i = 2nici.



















i   Ti : (6)
These cost savings increase in D
 
i and decline in D
+
i and in the transport
costs Ti. By setting C
f
i = Cn
i we can determine a critical level of transport
costs T
f;n


































i   miTi : (8)
7To check for robustness of our results, we also have considered versions of our model in
which the cosine function is shifted horizontally. Then the model may produce additional
regimes with oshoring intervals diering from full oshoring as it is dened here. The
basic insights of our model, however, remain: A partial oshoring regime exists for low
transport costs whereas for higher transport costs the rm may oshore longer segments
of the production chain.
10This dierence is positive as long as transport costs are below a critical value
T
p;n









Finally, the cost advantage from partial oshoring versus full oshoring










i   (mi   1)Ti : (10)
Partial oshoring saves costs compared to full oshoring as long as transport
costs are below a critical value T
p;f









We are now ready to lay out the choice of an oshoring regime for industry
i in Proposition 1.8
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Then we can distinguish
two cases:







There is partial oshoring for Ti < T
p;f
i , full oshoring for T
p;f
i < Ti 
T
f;n
i , and no oshoring for Ti  T
f;n
i .







There is partial oshoring for Ti < T
p;n
i and no oshoring for Ti  T
p;n
i .
Proof. The ordering of the critical values of Ti for ci > Bi and ci  Bi
can be established from (7), (9) and (11). The results of Proposition 1 then
follow immediately.














i , and its intercept with the ordinate is higher. Both lines
therefore intersect, making either partial or full oshoring more attractive (to
the left or right of this intersection). Figure 3.a represents Case 1, where the
intersection T
p;f
i is in the rst quadrant, implying a positive cost advantage
compared to no oshoring. In this case, we can distinguish three areas:
partial oshoring for low transport costs Ti, full oshoring for intermediate
Ti and no oshoring for high transport costs. In Case 2 (Figure 3.b) the lines
8In Proposition 1 we assume that the rm chooses the oshoring mode associated with
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i intersect in the fourth quadrant, such that the area of
full oshoring vanishes.
The relationship between ci and Bi that distinguishes the two cases in
Proposition 1 is important since it determines whether the foreign country
has a total cost advantage or not: if ci > Bi this is the case and full oshoring
becomes attractive once transport costs decrease below the critical threshold
T
f;n
i . Conversely, if ci  Bi the factor cost advantage of the foreign country
is too small to make up for the oshoring costs on average. This excludes
full oshoring and induces rms to choose the partial oshoring regime once
transport costs are suciently low { i.e. smaller than T
p;n
i .
Proposition 1 reveals that oshoring activities may change in a catas-
trophic way if certain transport cost thresholds are passed. Note that for this
result we do not assume network eects or agglomeration economies More-
over, in Case 1, a hump-shaped pattern of oshoring activities emerges: As
transport costs decrease, there is rst a large increase in oshoring activities
as the sector moves from no oshoring to full oshoring. At a further reduc-
tion of transport costs the oshoring volume declines again while switching
to the partial oshoring regime.9
9For a related result in the context of a two-stage production process see Barba
Navaretti and Venables (2004).
124 Comparative-Static Analysis
We are now ready to determine the in
uence of our model parameters on the
oshoring pattern. Apparently, these parameters have consequences for both
the critical transport costs which separate the dierent oshoring-regimes
and the international allocation of production steps within a given regime.
We start by considering the extent of oshoring given that the sector is
in a certain oshoring regime. The empirical literature measures the extent
of oshoring as production value of intermediate inputs from abroad relative
to total production value (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b, 1999). In our






, j 2 U multiplied by ini
re
ects this extent of oshoring. Setting this interval in relation to the length
of the entire production chain 2ni, we may determine the share of foreign
production s
p



















With full oshoring the respective share s
f
















From dierentiating (12) or (13) we obtain the following comparative-static
results:
Proposition 2 Suppose sector i is in the partial or in the full oshoring
regime. The share of production that is oshored rises in ci and declines in
Bi. Furthermore, it declines in Ai i ci > Bi. In the full oshoring regime
the share of production that is oshored also rises in i and ni.
The in
uence of the domestic factor costs ci and of the average oshoring
cost Bi is straightforward.10 For the eects of changing the amplitude Ai
we have to distinguish whether the foreign country has a total cost advan-
tage (Case 1, ci > Bi) or not (Case 2, ci  Bi). In case 1, an increase
in the value of Ai, re
ecting starker contrasts between total costs at home
and abroad, lowers the extent of oshoring. In case 2, the opposite holds.
Due to the symmetry of the function di(t) the length ni of the production
chain (and similarly i) in
uences the share of foreign production only in
the full oshoring regime. The longer the production chain and the higher
10Recall that the function arccos(x) decreases in x.
13the frequency of the di(t) function, the shorter is the last sequence which is
produced at home relative to the total mass of tasks that are performed.
Apart from aecting the international allocation of production steps in
the partial or the full oshoring regime, a change in the technological envi-
ronment may also shift the regime borders of Figure 3 as summarized in the
following proposition.




i increases in ci and Ai and declines in Bi and i. It also increases
in ni i ci > Bi.
 T
p;n
i increases in ci and Ai and declines in Bi and i.
 T
p;f
i increases in Bi and Ai and declines in ci and i.
Proof. The results can be obtained from (7), (9), and (11) and the in
uence
of the exogenous variables on (2) and (3).
Interpreting these results, we begin with the in
uence of the average
oshoring costs Bi. In addition to a reduction in transport costs Ti global-
ization may materialize in a decline in Bi: a general improvement of com-
munication and information technologies lowers average oshoring costs and
thereby shifts the di(t) curve downward. According to Proposition 3 full o-
shoring then becomes more attractive compared to both alternatives, partial
oshoring and no oshoring. The range of transport costs that yields full
oshoring in Figure 3.a increases. For ci  Bi, (Figure 3.b) we have to com-
pare partial oshoring with no oshoring. Partial oshoring becomes more
advantageous for a larger range of transport costs if Bi declines. Thus, a de-
cline in average oshoring costs causes a tendency towards more oshoring {
not only in terms of the number of tasks that are oshored within a certain
regime but also in terms of a potential shift towards a regime with more
oshoring.
Figure 4 depicts the combined in
uence of Ti and Bi on the regime bor-
ders. Partial oshoring only occurs if transport costs Ti are low and average
oshoring costs are neither too large nor too small. If transport costs Ti are
high, but average oshoring costs are low, rms prefer full oshoring. In all
other cases there is no oshoring.11










Figure 4: Oshoring Regimes
With respect to the other parameters, we see from Proposition 3 that an
increase in the amplitude Ai or the period 2=i of the oshoring cost func-
tion raises all critical transport costs: as cost dierences between adjacent
production steps diminish and the size of potential cost savings increases,
partial oshoring becomes more attractive at given costs of transportation.
The length of the production chain ni only in
uences the border T
f;n
i be-
tween the full oshoring regime and no oshoring. The longer the production
chain, the more attractive full oshoring becomes since the transport costs
associated with repatriating the unnished good before the nal production
segment become less important relative to potential cost savings.
5 Extensions: Modularization and Global Pro-
duction Networks
5.1 Modularization
In the analysis so far we have taken the production chain for good i as non-
divisible, i.e. a rm that decided to relocate a production step or a series
of production steps had to ship the entire unnished good to the plant in
the foreign country and back. In most industries, however, the production
process can be sub-divided into dierent components or modules that are
manufactured individually and then assembled in a nal production step.
Our model can be easily extended to incorporate such a modularization
of production. For this, we may view a component as a section of the









Figure 5: Modularization and Oshoring
total production chain that can be separated from other sections and man-
ufactured individually. To keep our symmetric set-up, we assume that the
production chain can be subdivided into ki such sections of equal length (the
components).Transport costs for each component are Ti=ki, and the length
of each segment is 2ni=ki. We furthermore assume that nii=ki 2 N+, i.e.
each segments covers one or multiples of a full cycle.
Modularization makes full oshoring more attractive compared to our
baseline model as it breaks up the production chain. Some segments which
can be produced cheaper at home now move to the end of the production
chain. They can be produced at home as they are no longer captured be-
tween oshored segments in the middle of the production chain (Figure 5).
Consequently, the critical transport cost T
f;n





























The range of transport costs which leads to full oshoring expands whereas
the partial oshoring regime becomes smaller.
5.2 Global Production Networks
So far we have assumed that rms in the domestic economy may oshore
production steps to a homogeneous \rest of the world". In reality, however,
16domestic producers face a multitude of foreign countries which dier substan-
tially in terms of relative factor prices and oshoring costs, and they may
exploit these dierences by establishing global production networks.
To show how our framework can be modied to analyze this scenario we
distinguish between two foreign countries (\country I" and \country II").
Without loss of generality we normalize factor costs in industry i to equal

















with j 2 fI, IIg and 
j
i 2 [0;2]. To demonstrate the implications of this
modication for oshoring patterns in the simplest possible framework we






i = Bi for both coun-
tries. Moreover, we set I
i = 0, II
i = , and Bi = ci,12 and we assume
that transport costs Ti are the same between all locations. Figure 6 depicts
the resulting pattern of oshoring costs in countries I and II (relative to the
domestic economy) for mi = 4. Given the above assumptions, there is a
perfectly negative correlation between the two countries' cost advantages:
whenever country I oers lower costs, country II is at a disadvantage, and
vice versa. Note, however, that we still stick to the assumption that the nal
good is sold in the domestic economy. Hence, if the last production step is
performed in one of the two foreign countries, rms have to account for the
costs of nal shipping.
Given this setup, we may still distinguish between three oshoring regimes,
however, the regime types now dier from our baseline model. The rm now
produces in both foreign countries, and we call such a situation a \global
network".13 Depending on transport costs, the home country may be incor-
porated as a production site or not. More precisely, we may dene a partial
global network as a regime in which all production steps in the interval [0;t
mi)
are located abroad { in country I and country II { and the steps in the interval
[t
mi;2ni] are performed in the domestic economy. In a full global network,
the rm produces entirely abroad in the two foreign countries. Note that the
important dierence between the two global network regimes is that a full
global network requires one additional run of transportation, but allows the
rm to save costs for a wider range of production steps.





13Given our assumption Bi = c, it is never optimal for the rm to perform all production

































Figure 6: Oshoring Costs with Two Foreign Countries




















i   miTi ; (17)
where we have used the superscript global to indicate the presence of global
production networks.
The cost dierences as a function of Ti are depicted in Figure 7. As in
the benchmark model, no oshoring is optimal for very high transport costs.
As Ti decreases, a partial global network becomes preferable, i.e. rms shift
a large part of the production process abroad, but the nal sequence of steps
is performed at home. As transportation costs decrease further, moving in-
termediate goods between countries is cheap enough to make a full global
network optimal. Note that this result contrasts with the constellation de-
rived in the benchmark model: There, decreasing costs of transportation
eventually caused a shift to partial oshoring and a large share of produc-
tion was performed in the domestic economy. By contrast, the possibility
to establish a global production network and to exploit cost dierences be-
tween dierent foreign countries leads to a dramatic increase in the oshoring
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Figure 7: Global Production
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced a new approach to analyze rms' oshoring de-
cisions. In contrast to existing models, in which single tasks or production
steps can be arranged according to their oshoring costs, we have taken into
account that, due to technological constraints, the sequence of production
steps can rarely be varied at will. Combined with the plausible assumption
that shifting intermediate goods between dierent locations is costly, this
may lead to a clustering of individual production steps, such that the deci-
sion to produce a single step at home or abroad depends on the location of
preceding or subsequent steps. In our framework, this leads to three dier-
ent oshoring regimes: partial, full or no oshoring. We have shown that
the borders between these regimes depend in a non-trivial way on costs of
transportation and on oshoring costs. Thus, the in
uence of globalization
{ dened as improved international communication and reduced barriers to
international trade { on the oshoring pattern is far from straightforward:
on the one hand, rms may be reluctant to oshore certain production steps
although, considered in isolation, these steps could be performed at far lower
costs abroad. On the other hand, minor changes in the costs of oshoring
or technological innovations aecting the structure of the production process
may result in the relocation of considerable parts of the production chain all
at once.
With regard to further advances in theory, the next logical step is to
embed our oshoring model into a general equilibrium framework of interna-
tional trade. We may then be able to obtain new insights into the relation-
19ship between the conditions for oshoring and factor rewards. Moreover, it
should be possible to empirically test the implications of our approach. Our
model suggests that one needs to take into account that various industries
dier with respect to the \sequentiality" and potential modularization of
their production chains, the size and relevance of transport costs, as well as
the costs of relocating individual production steps. In our view, a rm grasp
of these technological constraints holds the key for a better understanding of
the extent and evolution of oshoring.
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